From 753387164ce9d0b610ceae93830cfe1f26f0fdd2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dimitri Sokolyuk Date: Sun, 18 Sep 2016 10:20:38 +0200 Subject: Initial import - WIP --- orig/signify.c | 799 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 799 insertions(+) create mode 100644 orig/signify.c (limited to 'orig/signify.c') diff --git a/orig/signify.c b/orig/signify.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a4cb84a --- /dev/null +++ b/orig/signify.c @@ -0,0 +1,799 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: signify.c,v 1.105 2015/12/04 11:05:22 tedu Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013 Ted Unangst + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ +#include + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "crypto_api.h" + +#define SIGBYTES crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES +#define SECRETBYTES crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES +#define PUBLICBYTES crypto_sign_ed25519_PUBLICKEYBYTES + +#define PKALG "Ed" +#define KDFALG "BK" +#define KEYNUMLEN 8 + +#define COMMENTHDR "untrusted comment: " +#define COMMENTHDRLEN 19 +#define COMMENTMAXLEN 1024 +#define VERIFYWITH "verify with " + +struct enckey { + uint8_t pkalg[2]; + uint8_t kdfalg[2]; + uint32_t kdfrounds; + uint8_t salt[16]; + uint8_t checksum[8]; + uint8_t keynum[KEYNUMLEN]; + uint8_t seckey[SECRETBYTES]; +}; + +struct pubkey { + uint8_t pkalg[2]; + uint8_t keynum[KEYNUMLEN]; + uint8_t pubkey[PUBLICBYTES]; +}; + +struct sig { + uint8_t pkalg[2]; + uint8_t keynum[KEYNUMLEN]; + uint8_t sig[SIGBYTES]; +}; + +extern char *__progname; + +static void __dead +usage(const char *error) +{ + if (error) + fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", error); + fprintf(stderr, "usage:" +#ifndef VERIFYONLY + "\t%1$s -C [-q] -p pubkey -x sigfile [file ...]\n" + "\t%1$s -G [-n] [-c comment] -p pubkey -s seckey\n" + "\t%1$s -S [-e] [-x sigfile] -s seckey -m message\n" +#endif + "\t%1$s -V [-eq] [-x sigfile] -p pubkey -m message\n", + __progname); + exit(1); +} + +static int +xopen(const char *fname, int oflags, mode_t mode) +{ + struct stat sb; + int fd; + + if (strcmp(fname, "-") == 0) { + if ((oflags & O_WRONLY)) + fd = dup(STDOUT_FILENO); + else + fd = dup(STDIN_FILENO); + if (fd == -1) + err(1, "dup failed"); + } else { + fd = open(fname, oflags, mode); + if (fd == -1) + err(1, "can't open %s for %s", fname, + (oflags & O_WRONLY) ? "writing" : "reading"); + } + if (fstat(fd, &sb) == -1 || S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) + errx(1, "not a valid file: %s", fname); + return fd; +} + +static void * +xmalloc(size_t len) +{ + void *p; + + if (!(p = malloc(len))) + err(1, "malloc %zu", len); + return p; +} + +static size_t +parseb64file(const char *filename, char *b64, void *buf, size_t buflen, + char *comment) +{ + char *commentend, *b64end; + + commentend = strchr(b64, '\n'); + if (!commentend || commentend - b64 <= COMMENTHDRLEN || + memcmp(b64, COMMENTHDR, COMMENTHDRLEN) != 0) + errx(1, "invalid comment in %s; must start with '%s'", + filename, COMMENTHDR); + *commentend = '\0'; + if (comment) { + if (strlcpy(comment, b64 + COMMENTHDRLEN, + COMMENTMAXLEN) >= COMMENTMAXLEN) + errx(1, "comment too long"); + } + if (!(b64end = strchr(commentend + 1, '\n'))) + errx(1, "missing new line after base64 in %s", filename); + *b64end = '\0'; + if (b64_pton(commentend + 1, buf, buflen) != buflen) + errx(1, "invalid base64 encoding in %s", filename); + if (memcmp(buf, PKALG, 2) != 0) + errx(1, "unsupported file %s", filename); + return b64end - b64 + 1; +} + +static void +readb64file(const char *filename, void *buf, size_t buflen, char *comment) +{ + char b64[2048]; + int rv, fd; + + fd = xopen(filename, O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW, 0); + if ((rv = read(fd, b64, sizeof(b64) - 1)) == -1) + err(1, "read from %s", filename); + b64[rv] = '\0'; + parseb64file(filename, b64, buf, buflen, comment); + explicit_bzero(b64, sizeof(b64)); + close(fd); +} + +static uint8_t * +readmsg(const char *filename, unsigned long long *msglenp) +{ + unsigned long long msglen = 0; + uint8_t *msg = NULL; + struct stat sb; + ssize_t x, space; + int fd; + const unsigned long long maxmsgsize = 1UL << 30; + + fd = xopen(filename, O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW, 0); + if (fstat(fd, &sb) == 0 && S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { + if (sb.st_size > maxmsgsize) + errx(1, "msg too large in %s", filename); + space = sb.st_size + 1; + } else { + space = 64 * 1024 - 1; + } + + msg = xmalloc(space + 1); + while (1) { + if (space == 0) { + if (msglen * 2 > maxmsgsize) + errx(1, "msg too large in %s", filename); + space = msglen; + if (!(msg = realloc(msg, msglen + space + 1))) + errx(1, "realloc"); + } + if ((x = read(fd, msg + msglen, space)) == -1) + err(1, "read from %s", filename); + if (x == 0) + break; + space -= x; + msglen += x; + } + + msg[msglen] = '\0'; + close(fd); + + *msglenp = msglen; + return msg; +} + +static void +writeall(int fd, const void *buf, size_t buflen, const char *filename) +{ + ssize_t x; + + while (buflen != 0) { + if ((x = write(fd, buf, buflen)) == -1) + err(1, "write to %s", filename); + buflen -= x; + buf = (char *)buf + x; + } +} + +#ifndef VERIFYONLY +static void +writeb64file(const char *filename, const char *comment, const void *buf, + size_t buflen, const void *msg, size_t msglen, int oflags, mode_t mode) +{ + char header[1024]; + char b64[1024]; + int fd, rv, nr; + + fd = xopen(filename, O_CREAT|oflags|O_NOFOLLOW|O_WRONLY, mode); + if ((nr = snprintf(header, sizeof(header), "%s%s\n", + COMMENTHDR, comment)) == -1 || nr >= sizeof(header)) + errx(1, "comment too long"); + writeall(fd, header, strlen(header), filename); + if ((rv = b64_ntop(buf, buflen, b64, sizeof(b64))) == -1) + errx(1, "base64 encode failed"); + b64[rv++] = '\n'; + writeall(fd, b64, rv, filename); + explicit_bzero(b64, sizeof(b64)); + if (msg) + writeall(fd, msg, msglen, filename); + close(fd); +} + +static void +kdf(uint8_t *salt, size_t saltlen, int rounds, int allowstdin, int confirm, + uint8_t *key, size_t keylen) +{ + char pass[1024]; + int rppflags = RPP_ECHO_OFF; + + if (rounds == 0) { + memset(key, 0, keylen); + return; + } + + if (allowstdin && !isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) + rppflags |= RPP_STDIN; + if (!readpassphrase("passphrase: ", pass, sizeof(pass), rppflags)) + errx(1, "unable to read passphrase"); + if (strlen(pass) == 0) + errx(1, "please provide a password"); + if (confirm && !(rppflags & RPP_STDIN)) { + char pass2[1024]; + if (!readpassphrase("confirm passphrase: ", pass2, + sizeof(pass2), rppflags)) + errx(1, "unable to read passphrase"); + if (strcmp(pass, pass2) != 0) + errx(1, "passwords don't match"); + explicit_bzero(pass2, sizeof(pass2)); + } + if (bcrypt_pbkdf(pass, strlen(pass), salt, saltlen, key, + keylen, rounds) == -1) + errx(1, "bcrypt pbkdf"); + explicit_bzero(pass, sizeof(pass)); +} + +static void +signmsg(uint8_t *seckey, uint8_t *msg, unsigned long long msglen, + uint8_t *sig) +{ + unsigned long long siglen; + uint8_t *sigbuf; + + sigbuf = xmalloc(msglen + SIGBYTES); + crypto_sign_ed25519(sigbuf, &siglen, msg, msglen, seckey); + memcpy(sig, sigbuf, SIGBYTES); + free(sigbuf); +} + +static void +generate(const char *pubkeyfile, const char *seckeyfile, int rounds, + const char *comment) +{ + uint8_t digest[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + struct pubkey pubkey; + struct enckey enckey; + uint8_t xorkey[sizeof(enckey.seckey)]; + uint8_t keynum[KEYNUMLEN]; + char commentbuf[COMMENTMAXLEN]; + SHA2_CTX ctx; + int i, nr; + + crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair(pubkey.pubkey, enckey.seckey); + arc4random_buf(keynum, sizeof(keynum)); + + SHA512Init(&ctx); + SHA512Update(&ctx, enckey.seckey, sizeof(enckey.seckey)); + SHA512Final(digest, &ctx); + + memcpy(enckey.pkalg, PKALG, 2); + memcpy(enckey.kdfalg, KDFALG, 2); + enckey.kdfrounds = htonl(rounds); + memcpy(enckey.keynum, keynum, KEYNUMLEN); + arc4random_buf(enckey.salt, sizeof(enckey.salt)); + kdf(enckey.salt, sizeof(enckey.salt), rounds, 1, 1, xorkey, sizeof(xorkey)); + memcpy(enckey.checksum, digest, sizeof(enckey.checksum)); + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(enckey.seckey); i++) + enckey.seckey[i] ^= xorkey[i]; + explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); + explicit_bzero(xorkey, sizeof(xorkey)); + + if ((nr = snprintf(commentbuf, sizeof(commentbuf), "%s secret key", + comment)) == -1 || nr >= sizeof(commentbuf)) + errx(1, "comment too long"); + writeb64file(seckeyfile, commentbuf, &enckey, + sizeof(enckey), NULL, 0, O_EXCL, 0600); + explicit_bzero(&enckey, sizeof(enckey)); + + memcpy(pubkey.pkalg, PKALG, 2); + memcpy(pubkey.keynum, keynum, KEYNUMLEN); + if ((nr = snprintf(commentbuf, sizeof(commentbuf), "%s public key", + comment)) == -1 || nr >= sizeof(commentbuf)) + errx(1, "comment too long"); + writeb64file(pubkeyfile, commentbuf, &pubkey, + sizeof(pubkey), NULL, 0, O_EXCL, 0666); +} + +static void +sign(const char *seckeyfile, const char *msgfile, const char *sigfile, + int embedded) +{ + struct sig sig; + uint8_t digest[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + struct enckey enckey; + uint8_t xorkey[sizeof(enckey.seckey)]; + uint8_t *msg; + char comment[COMMENTMAXLEN], sigcomment[COMMENTMAXLEN]; + char *secname; + unsigned long long msglen; + int i, rounds, nr; + SHA2_CTX ctx; + + readb64file(seckeyfile, &enckey, sizeof(enckey), comment); + + if (memcmp(enckey.kdfalg, KDFALG, 2) != 0) + errx(1, "unsupported KDF"); + rounds = ntohl(enckey.kdfrounds); + kdf(enckey.salt, sizeof(enckey.salt), rounds, strcmp(msgfile, "-") != 0, + 0, xorkey, sizeof(xorkey)); + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(enckey.seckey); i++) + enckey.seckey[i] ^= xorkey[i]; + explicit_bzero(xorkey, sizeof(xorkey)); + SHA512Init(&ctx); + SHA512Update(&ctx, enckey.seckey, sizeof(enckey.seckey)); + SHA512Final(digest, &ctx); + if (memcmp(enckey.checksum, digest, sizeof(enckey.checksum)) != 0) + errx(1, "incorrect passphrase"); + explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); + + msg = readmsg(msgfile, &msglen); + + signmsg(enckey.seckey, msg, msglen, sig.sig); + memcpy(sig.keynum, enckey.keynum, KEYNUMLEN); + explicit_bzero(&enckey, sizeof(enckey)); + + memcpy(sig.pkalg, PKALG, 2); + secname = strstr(seckeyfile, ".sec"); + if (secname && strlen(secname) == 4) { + if ((nr = snprintf(sigcomment, sizeof(sigcomment), VERIFYWITH "%.*s.pub", + (int)strlen(seckeyfile) - 4, seckeyfile)) == -1 || nr >= sizeof(sigcomment)) + errx(1, "comment too long"); + } else { + if ((nr = snprintf(sigcomment, sizeof(sigcomment), "signature from %s", + comment)) == -1 || nr >= sizeof(sigcomment)) + errx(1, "comment too long"); + } + if (embedded) + writeb64file(sigfile, sigcomment, &sig, sizeof(sig), msg, + msglen, O_TRUNC, 0666); + else + writeb64file(sigfile, sigcomment, &sig, sizeof(sig), NULL, + 0, O_TRUNC, 0666); + + free(msg); +} +#endif + +static void +verifymsg(struct pubkey *pubkey, uint8_t *msg, unsigned long long msglen, + struct sig *sig, int quiet) +{ + uint8_t *sigbuf, *dummybuf; + unsigned long long siglen, dummylen; + + if (memcmp(pubkey->keynum, sig->keynum, KEYNUMLEN) != 0) + errx(1, "verification failed: checked against wrong key"); + + siglen = SIGBYTES + msglen; + sigbuf = xmalloc(siglen); + dummybuf = xmalloc(siglen); + memcpy(sigbuf, sig->sig, SIGBYTES); + memcpy(sigbuf + SIGBYTES, msg, msglen); + if (crypto_sign_ed25519_open(dummybuf, &dummylen, sigbuf, siglen, + pubkey->pubkey) == -1) + errx(1, "signature verification failed"); + if (!quiet) + printf("Signature Verified\n"); + free(sigbuf); + free(dummybuf); +} + +static void +readpubkey(const char *pubkeyfile, struct pubkey *pubkey, + const char *sigcomment) +{ + const char *safepath = "/etc/signify/"; + + if (!pubkeyfile) { + pubkeyfile = strstr(sigcomment, VERIFYWITH); + if (pubkeyfile) { + pubkeyfile += strlen(VERIFYWITH); + if (strncmp(pubkeyfile, safepath, strlen(safepath)) != 0 || + strstr(pubkeyfile, "/../") != NULL) + errx(1, "untrusted path %s", pubkeyfile); + } else + usage("must specify pubkey"); + } + readb64file(pubkeyfile, pubkey, sizeof(*pubkey), NULL); +} + +static void +verifysimple(const char *pubkeyfile, const char *msgfile, const char *sigfile, + int quiet) +{ + char sigcomment[COMMENTMAXLEN]; + struct sig sig; + struct pubkey pubkey; + unsigned long long msglen; + uint8_t *msg; + + msg = readmsg(msgfile, &msglen); + + readb64file(sigfile, &sig, sizeof(sig), sigcomment); + readpubkey(pubkeyfile, &pubkey, sigcomment); + + verifymsg(&pubkey, msg, msglen, &sig, quiet); + + free(msg); +} + +static uint8_t * +verifyembedded(const char *pubkeyfile, const char *sigfile, + int quiet, unsigned long long *msglenp) +{ + char sigcomment[COMMENTMAXLEN]; + struct sig sig; + struct pubkey pubkey; + unsigned long long msglen, siglen; + uint8_t *msg; + + msg = readmsg(sigfile, &msglen); + + siglen = parseb64file(sigfile, msg, &sig, sizeof(sig), sigcomment); + readpubkey(pubkeyfile, &pubkey, sigcomment); + + msglen -= siglen; + memmove(msg, msg + siglen, msglen); + msg[msglen] = 0; + + verifymsg(&pubkey, msg, msglen, &sig, quiet); + + *msglenp = msglen; + return msg; +} + +static void +verify(const char *pubkeyfile, const char *msgfile, const char *sigfile, + int embedded, int quiet) +{ + unsigned long long msglen; + uint8_t *msg; + int fd; + + if (embedded) { + msg = verifyembedded(pubkeyfile, sigfile, quiet, &msglen); + fd = xopen(msgfile, O_CREAT|O_TRUNC|O_NOFOLLOW|O_WRONLY, 0666); + writeall(fd, msg, msglen, msgfile); + free(msg); + close(fd); + } else { + verifysimple(pubkeyfile, msgfile, sigfile, quiet); + } +} + +#ifndef VERIFYONLY +#define HASHBUFSIZE 224 +struct checksum { + char file[PATH_MAX]; + char hash[HASHBUFSIZE]; + char algo[32]; +}; + +static void * +ecalloc(size_t s1, size_t s2, void *data) +{ + void *p; + + if (!(p = calloc(s1, s2))) + err(1, "calloc"); + return p; +} + +static void +efree(void *p, void *data) +{ + free(p); +} + +static void +recodehash(char *hash, size_t len) +{ + uint8_t data[HASHBUFSIZE / 2]; + int i, rv; + + if (strlen(hash) == len) + return; + if ((rv = b64_pton(hash, data, sizeof(data))) == -1) + errx(1, "invalid base64 encoding"); + for (i = 0; i < rv; i++) + snprintf(hash + i * 2, HASHBUFSIZE - i * 2, "%2.2x", data[i]); +} + +static int +verifychecksum(struct checksum *c, int quiet) +{ + char buf[HASHBUFSIZE]; + + if (strcmp(c->algo, "SHA256") == 0) { + recodehash(c->hash, SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH-1); + if (!SHA256File(c->file, buf)) + return 0; + } else if (strcmp(c->algo, "SHA512") == 0) { + recodehash(c->hash, SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH-1); + if (!SHA512File(c->file, buf)) + return 0; + } else { + errx(1, "can't handle algorithm %s", c->algo); + } + if (strcmp(c->hash, buf) != 0) + return 0; + if (!quiet) + printf("%s: OK\n", c->file); + return 1; +} + +static void +verifychecksums(char *msg, int argc, char **argv, int quiet) +{ + struct ohash_info info = { 0, NULL, ecalloc, efree, NULL }; + struct ohash myh; + struct checksum c; + char *e, *line, *endline; + int hasfailed = 0; + int i, rv; + unsigned int slot; + + ohash_init(&myh, 6, &info); + if (argc) { + for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { + slot = ohash_qlookup(&myh, argv[i]); + e = ohash_find(&myh, slot); + if (e == NULL) + ohash_insert(&myh, slot, argv[i]); + } + } + + line = msg; + while (line && *line) { + if ((endline = strchr(line, '\n'))) + *endline++ = '\0'; +#if PATH_MAX < 1024 || HASHBUFSIZE < 224 +#error sizes are wrong +#endif + rv = sscanf(line, "%31s (%1023[^)]) = %223s", + c.algo, c.file, c.hash); + if (rv != 3) + errx(1, "unable to parse checksum line %s", line); + line = endline; + if (argc) { + slot = ohash_qlookup(&myh, c.file); + e = ohash_find(&myh, slot); + if (e != NULL) { + if (verifychecksum(&c, quiet) != 0) + ohash_remove(&myh, slot); + } + } else { + if (verifychecksum(&c, quiet) == 0) { + slot = ohash_qlookup(&myh, c.file); + e = ohash_find(&myh, slot); + if (e == NULL) { + if (!(e = strdup(c.file))) + err(1, "strdup"); + ohash_insert(&myh, slot, e); + } + } + } + } + + for (e = ohash_first(&myh, &slot); e != NULL; e = ohash_next(&myh, &slot)) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: FAIL\n", e); + hasfailed = 1; + if (argc == 0) + free(e); + } + ohash_delete(&myh); + if (hasfailed) + exit(1); +} + +static void +check(const char *pubkeyfile, const char *sigfile, int quiet, int argc, + char **argv) +{ + unsigned long long msglen; + uint8_t *msg; + + msg = verifyembedded(pubkeyfile, sigfile, quiet, &msglen); + verifychecksums((char *)msg, argc, argv, quiet); + + free(msg); +} +#endif + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + const char *pubkeyfile = NULL, *seckeyfile = NULL, *msgfile = NULL, + *sigfile = NULL; + char sigfilebuf[PATH_MAX]; + const char *comment = "signify"; + int ch, rounds; + int embedded = 0; + int quiet = 0; + enum { + NONE, + CHECK, + GENERATE, + SIGN, + VERIFY + } verb = NONE; + + if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath tty", NULL) == -1) + err(1, "pledge"); + + rounds = 42; + + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "CGSVc:em:np:qs:x:")) != -1) { + switch (ch) { +#ifndef VERIFYONLY + case 'C': + if (verb) + usage(NULL); + verb = CHECK; + break; + case 'G': + if (verb) + usage(NULL); + verb = GENERATE; + break; + case 'S': + if (verb) + usage(NULL); + verb = SIGN; + break; +#endif + case 'V': + if (verb) + usage(NULL); + verb = VERIFY; + break; + case 'c': + comment = optarg; + break; + case 'e': + embedded = 1; + break; + case 'm': + msgfile = optarg; + break; + case 'n': + rounds = 0; + break; + case 'p': + pubkeyfile = optarg; + break; + case 'q': + quiet = 1; + break; + case 's': + seckeyfile = optarg; + break; + case 'x': + sigfile = optarg; + break; + default: + usage(NULL); + break; + } + } + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0) != 0) + err(1, "setvbuf"); + + switch (verb) { + case GENERATE: + case SIGN: + /* keep it all */ + break; + case CHECK: + if (pledge("stdio rpath", NULL) == -1) + err(1, "pledge"); + break; + case VERIFY: + if (embedded && (!msgfile || strcmp(msgfile, "-") != 0)) { + if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath", NULL) == -1) + err(1, "pledge"); + } else { + if (pledge("stdio rpath", NULL) == -1) + err(1, "pledge"); + } + break; + default: + if (pledge("stdio", NULL) == -1) + err(1, "pledge"); + break; + } + +#ifndef VERIFYONLY + if (verb == CHECK) { + if (!sigfile) + usage("must specify sigfile"); + check(pubkeyfile, sigfile, quiet, argc, argv); + return 0; + } +#endif + + if (argc != 0) + usage(NULL); + + if (!sigfile && msgfile) { + int nr; + if (strcmp(msgfile, "-") == 0) + usage("must specify sigfile with - message"); + if ((nr = snprintf(sigfilebuf, sizeof(sigfilebuf), "%s.sig", + msgfile)) == -1 || nr >= sizeof(sigfilebuf)) + errx(1, "path too long"); + sigfile = sigfilebuf; + } + + switch (verb) { +#ifndef VERIFYONLY + case GENERATE: + if (!pubkeyfile || !seckeyfile) + usage("must specify pubkey and seckey"); + generate(pubkeyfile, seckeyfile, rounds, comment); + break; + case SIGN: + if (!msgfile || !seckeyfile) + usage("must specify message and seckey"); + sign(seckeyfile, msgfile, sigfile, embedded); + break; +#endif + case VERIFY: + if (!msgfile) + usage("must specify message"); + verify(pubkeyfile, msgfile, sigfile, embedded, quiet); + break; + default: + usage(NULL); + break; + } + + return 0; +} -- cgit v1.2.3